12·3 비상계엄의 뇌관, 김명수 전 합참의장 구속영장 청구가 던지는 파장 > K-wave Trends

The core of this arrest warrant request lies in how to interpret the nature of the "omissions" and "orders" shown by former JCS Chairman Kim Myung-soo as a military commander after the declaration of martial law. The Special Prosecutor's team is strongly questioning the fact that despite receiving multiple reports from his staff regarding the procedural illegality of the martial law declaration and the impropriety of deploying troops to the National Assembly, Chairman Kim neither stopped the actions nor recommended the withdrawal of troops to the Minister of National Defense. In particular, the Special Prosecutor views his act of issuing a fragmentary order to the Special Warfare Command and the Capital Defense Command to "prioritize martial law affairs" as evidence that he actively supported the execution of martial law, rather than merely observing the situation. This will likely be the decisive clue in determining whether the military's top commander passively neglected his command authority at a scene where constitutional order was collapsing, or actively participated in illegal acts.

Former Chairman Kim's side is vehemently denying these charges, arguing strongly that under the military command structure at the time, he had no real decision-making power. His legal team claims that during the 12·3 emergency martial law, former Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun was directly commanding and controlling the martial law troops, and that he himself was thoroughly excluded from the decision-making process and in a state where he could not exercise operational command. Furthermore, Chairman Kim himself emphasized his security control guidelines—aimed at preventing security gaps against North Korea and avoiding accidental clashes—claiming that the fragmentary order at the time was a desperate measure limited to specific units to prevent other units from being swept into the vortex of martial law. However, the Special Prosecutor has secured circumstances through the testimonies of JCS officials that Chairman Kim issued direct instructions via handwritten notes and ignored staff recommendations for withdrawal, setting the stage for a direct clash between the two sides in court.

The fact that the Special Prosecutor excluded former Military Support Headquarters Chief Kang Dong-gil, former Operations Director Ahn Chan-myung, and former Operations Headquarters Chief Lee Seung-o from this warrant request demonstrates the precision of the investigation. These individuals were the ones who pointed out the illegality of the martial law to Chairman Kim at the time and recommended the withdrawal of troops from the National Assembly; it is reported that the Special Prosecutor is even considering non-indictment for them, using their actions as grounds to deny intent to participate in the insurrection. Conversely, former JCS Vice Chairman Jung Jin-pal, former Army Headquarters Policy Office Chief Kim Heung-jun, and former JCS Combat Readiness Inspection Chief Lee Jae-sik, for whom warrants were requested alongside Chairman Kim, were judged to have been responsible for supporting Chairman Kim's actions or standing by during the troop deployment process. This is interpreted as the Special Prosecutor's will to sharpen the edge of the investigation by distinguishing between "leadership responsibility" and "staff resistance."

Another flashpoint of the case lies in the situation that occurred after the National Assembly's resolution demanding the lifting of martial law and Chairman Kim's response. Former National Security Office Director Shin Won-sik testified during a witness interview that Chairman Kim requested him to "make it lifted as quickly as possible" after the National Assembly's demand, but the Special Prosecutor is not ruling out the possibility that this testimony actually serves as proof that Chairman Kim was aware of the martial law situation at the time. In particular, as testimony has been secured that there were attempts to deploy additional troops even after the National Assembly's demand for lifting, suspicions regarding what role Chairman Kim played in the process of the second martial law attempt have emerged as a new key issue in the investigation. The process of uncovering until what point Chairman Kim, as the JCS Chairman with military command authority, tried to protect constitutional values, or from when he began to cooperate with illegal acts, will determine the success or failure of this investigation.

As this investigation is being treated as the "No. 1 recognized case" among the three major special investigations, it has become a critical test to confirm our military's political neutrality and will to uphold the Constitution. While the past insurrection special investigation deemed it difficult to hold Chairman Kim responsible on the grounds that military command authority was transferred to the Martial Law Commander after the declaration, the 2nd Comprehensive Special Investigation is seeking differentiation from the previous investigation by putting forward the legal judgment that military command authority can remain vested in the JCS Chairman even after the declaration of martial law. This legal confrontation is expected to be subject to the court's strict standards in the upcoming suspect interrogation before arrest (warrant validity review). Once the decision on securing the military leadership is made, the investigation into the substantive truth of the 12·3 emergency martial law is expected to gain further momentum toward the higher-ups in the Ministry of National Defense and the Martial Law Command.